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abstract 
In Japan, newspapers enjoy a special exemption from antimonopoly prohibitions against 
resale price maintenance (suppliers’ stipulations that bar downstream firms from price 
discounting), but are each required to set uniform prices throughout Japan.  In fact, the 
newspapers have rarely changed their subscription prices in recent years, and the three 
leading national dailies, together accounting for about half the total industry circulation, and 
thirteen other papers accounting for another one eighth of industry circulation, all have set 
exactly the same price (3,925 yen per month for combined morning-and-evening editions, 
and 3,007 yen per month for morning-only).  The remaining local papers all set lower prices.  
Econometric analysis here shows that Japanese newspaper subscription prices are far below 
the levels that would maximize joint profit, given the newspaper content. The authorized 
resale price maintenance, and prohibition against prices that vary geographically, seems to 
have allowed only modest collusive price increases.   
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1.  Introduction. 
In Japan, newspapers enjoy a special exemption from antimonopoly prohibitions 
against resale price maintenance (suppliers’ stipulations that bar downstream firms from price 
discounting), but are each required to set geographically uniform prices throughout Japan.  
The three leading national dailies, and eleven of the regional and local dailies, seem to have 
exploited this antitrust exemption to maintain collusive subscription fees, setting the same 
subscription prices as one another which are higher than those of the smaller circulation 
newspapers.  The main result of the present paper is that these presumptively collusive 
subscription prices are actually well below the levels that would maximize the joint profit of 
the newspapers that set those prices, given the newspaper content. This result is based on 
estimates of the elasticities of demand facing each newspaper, and estimates of some costs of 
producing newspapers net of the marginal profit from newspaper advertising. It is an open 
question whether the subscription price collusion is simply ineffective, or is effective but 
constrained (for example constrained by the likelihood that collusive price increases would 
induce costly expansions of newspaper content). 
The econometric analysis that is the central focus of the present paper follows in a 
line of research on newspaper economics initiated by Rosse (1970) and extending to Van 
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007), Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009), Fan (2013), and 
others.  The main novelties of this paper are that it uses micro-data rather than only 
aggregate data to estimate demand, and it models the interdependence of demand between 
morning-only subscriptions and morning-and-evening subscriptions offered by the same 
newspaper. It is also the first contribution to this literature that focuses on the Japanese 
newspaper industry, which is among the largest in the world based on circulation and which 
is showing remarkable resilience in the face of increasing competition from digital media. 
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     The micro-data used here come from a March 2007 random-direct-dial telephone 
survey of 27,788 persons living throughout Japan conducted by Video Research, Ltd. (the 
2007 edition of its annual JREAD survey).  I use these data to estimate the common 
parameters of a mixed-logit indirect utility function relating respondents’ choices among 
available daily newspaper subscriptions (including the choice of not subscribing to any 
newspaper), to their own individual characteristics such as age, income and education and to 
attributes of the newspapers available in the prefecture where each resides.  Attributes of the 
newspapers include subscription price, number of pages of content per month, and whether 
the subscription is morning-and-evening or morning-only.  Although the national 
newspapers are priced the same everywhere in Japan, they compete with different local and 
regional newspapers in each prefecture.  The variation in choice sets across prefectures is 
sufficient to identify the effects of subscription price and other newspaper attributes on 
respondents’ choices.  I find that price elasticities of demand for most newspapers lie 
between 1.2 and 2 and that elasticities of demand with respect to number of pages of content 
per month lie between 0.2 and 0.5.  Because many of the Japanese newspapers offer a 
choice between morning-and-evening subscriptions and morning-only, interpreting these 
estimates requires a model that can accommodate the effects of price of each type of 
subscription on the demand for the other type. In effect, the newspapers offering both kinds 
of subscription are multiproduct oligopolists. I show how profit-maximizing newspapers 
consider the cross-elasticity of demand between the different types of subscription when 
setting the prices.  I also estimate the demand and supply of newspaper advertising using 
2007 cross-section data. 
     Before describing the analysis and estimates just alluded to, I shall first describe some 




2.  The Japanese Newspaper Industry. 
Japan has five national news dailies (Mainichi, Asahi, Yomiuri, Nikkei and Sankei), 
several bloc papers that are available in contiguous prefectures (Tokyo Shinbun, Chunichi 
Shimbun, Chugoku Shinbun, and Nishi Nippon Shinbun), and another 40 or 50 newspapers 
that each mainly serves a single prefecture.  The Nikkei, often compared with the Wall Street 
Journal, features business and financial news.  In this sense it is in a different category than 
the other national daily newspapers of Japan. More than half of the Nikkei subscribers also 
subscribe to another daily newspaper, while dual subscriptions among the newspapers other 
than Nikkei are rare. I will exclude Nikkei from my sample and maintain the assumption that 
each household selects at most one newspaper from among those other than Nikkei. The other 
four national dailies –Yomiuri, Mainichi, Asahi, and Sankei– together account for about half 
the total circulation of all newspapers. The total circulation of news dailies (not including 
sports dailies, tabloids, or political newspapers) in Japan is about 85 percent of the number of 
households and more than 95 percent of sales are by monthly subscription rather than 
single-issue.  
Table 1 shows the 2007 household penetration rates in each prefecture for the 
newspapers that are the focus of this study.  It includes the four national dailies other than 
Nikkei and all of the other dailies with circulation of 100,000 or more.  Of the 47 
newspapers, all four of the national newspapers and nine local newspapers are available in at 
least some prefectures either as morning-only subscription or morning-and-evening 
subscription. Another eight newspapers are only available as morning-and-evening 
subscription. And the remaining 18 do not publish evening editions.  It is evident from the 
table that the local papers enjoy large shares in many of the less populous prefectures.  This is 
even more evident in the Figure 1 showing the aggregate circulation of newspapers in each 
prefecture of Japan moving from west to east. 
The newspaper publishers distribute through independent newsdealers.  The typical 
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arrangement entails an exclusive geographic territory assigned by the newspaper company, 
daily purchase of a number of copies, the number being set by the newspaper company, and 
resale at a price stipulated by the newspaper –exclusive territory, stipulated resale price and a 
sales quota.  That the newspapers enforce sales quotas, which would violate antimonopoly 
proscriptions, is widely denied by the newspaper companies but is evidently a fact.  The 
newspapers that are shipped and billed to the distributors, and unwanted by them, are referred 
to as oshigami–literally “push papers”.  Documentation of this practice can be found in the 
Wikipedia entry for “shinbun hanbai ten” (newspaper sellers in Japan).  
The Japanese newspapers, and other publishers, enjoy a special exemption from 
antimonopoly prohibitions against resale price maintenance (Antimonopoly, Section 23-2 (4)).  
The exemption dates from the 1953 amendments to the 1947 Antimonopoly Law.   
Newspaper publishers are also bound by a special directive of the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission enjoining against charging differing prices according to the area or person buying 
(most recently “Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Newspaper Business”, Fair Trade 
Commission Notification, no. 9, July 21, 1999, amending the similar earlier notification no. 14, 
1964).  The directive also disallows discount pricing by newspaper distributors, and disallows 
the newspaper publishers from imposing minimum quantities (sales quotas) on distributors, 
though apparently as already stated the publishers do this anyway.  Under the special directive, 
each newspaper is free to set its own price but must then charge that same price wherever the 
newspaper is sold.  Different editions of a newspaper may command differing prices.  At 
least since 1945 and probably before that, the three leading national dailies Yomiuri, Asahi and 
Mainichi, have all set the same subscription price as one another and changed that price at 
roughly the same time as one another.  Price changes for all of the newspapers are infrequent.  
The last price change was in 2003, ten years ago.  Since then, a monthly morning-and-evening 
subscription to any of the four national newspapers is 3,925 yen (around $40).  A 
morning-only subscription to the three other than Sankei is 3,007 yen per month.  Not only 
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the three leading national newspapers but also 13 local and bloc newspapers set exactly these 
same prices. The other newspapers set lower prices.  The Japan Newspaper Association has 
publicly supported the continuation of the special antitrust exemption allowing newspapers to 
maintain retail prices and indeed forestalled the adoption of a proposal in 2001 to repeal it. 
Why resale price maintenance? A quick –and I think wrong– answer is that the retail 
price stipulation is actually a maximum retail price and is to prevent the independent 
distributors from exploiting the local monopolies that their exclusive territories confer.   By 
raising the price to increase its own profit a distributor would actually diminish the total profit 
in the supply chain, the successive monopoly problem.  Those who are familiar with US 
antitrust law will recall the Albrecht case1 in which Herald Publishing Company, publisher of 
the St. Louis Globe Democrat, was found by the U. S. Supreme Court to have violated 
prohibitions against resale price maintenance in an apparent attempt to deter exactly this sort of 
overpricing.  The resale price maintenance of Japanese newspapers is different because the 
sales quotas that the newspapers impose on the distributors deter the distributors from raising 
prices.  The sales quotas are set at levels that not only deter overpricing but that also encourage 
solicitation of new subscriptions.  Because of this, the stipulated retail prices are binding 
downward; they are price floors, not price ceilings.   
The resale price maintenance might be part of a cartel scheme2 among the newspaper 
companies.  But my estimates of the unit costs and elasticities of demand facing Japanese 
newspapers, which are the main content of the present paper, indicate that subscription prices 
                                                     
1 Albrecht v., Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
2 Examples of resale price maintenance as a producer cartel scheme have been noted empirically and explored 
theoretically.  We have the Telser (1960) discussion of the light bulb case.  In the early twentieth century, 
duopolists Westinghouse and GE sold light bulbs through exclusive independent retail outlets and both stipulated 
the same minimum resale prices.  In Telser’s explanation, retail price discounting could be more easily detected 
and deterred than could wholesale price discounting, and exclusive dealing prevented retailers’ profiting from any 
secret wholesale price discounts that were not passed on as retail price discounts.  In Flath (1989) I suggested that 
a producer cartel scheme was the likely motive for resale price maintenance by the three producers of infant 
powdered milk in Japan, as documented in a series of antimonopoly cases, from the 1960s and 1970s.  Jullien and 
Rey (2007) develop an algebraic model in which resale price maintenance facilitates collusion among producers 
because it makes deviations from the collusive scheme easier for the colluders to detect and credibly deter, as 
explained by Telser. 
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are well-below the levels that would maximize the combined profits of the presumptively 
colluding newspapers. That the leading newspapers set the same subscription prices as one 
another, prices that are higher than those of the smaller circulation local newspapers, and 
change those prices at the same time as one another and infrequently, all suggests 
coordination. If cooperating in choosing prices, then why not set the prices that maximize 
joint profit? I have no definitive answer apart from the obvious one that the impossibility of 
deterring cheating precludes cartel pricing. Perhaps the setting of a common price, even one 
below the cartel price, benefits the newspapers. Or perhaps the newspaper price collusion is 
constrained by the costly expansions of newspaper content that are induced by collusive price 
increases and difficult to block. 
It is undeniable that the newspapers collusively restrict their content, by observing a 
monthly newspaper holiday.  On one particular Monday each month, the newspapers all 
refrain from issuing a morning and evening edition.  The Japan Newspaper association 
defends this practice as needed to give the newspaper distributors vacation days.  This is 
absurd.  By rotating work shifts or deploying substitute workers, newsdealers could permit 
vacations.  The newspaper holidays amount to a collusive restriction of industry output, for 
both distributors and publishers.  That the newspaper holidays of the different papers are on 
the same days is evidence of collusion among the newspaper companies.  A rare instance of 
deviation is also revealing.  In February 2002, the Sankei Shimbun refrained from the practice 
of newspaper holiday.  The other papers publicly criticized Sankei but also themselves 
refrained from holidays.  Three months later the practice was reinstated, again with Sankei 
participating.  That deviation by Sankei triggered deviations by the others strongly suggests 
that the newspaper holidays have the character of a prisoners’ dilemma, as is generally true of 
cartel schemes.  
My aim is to characterize the pricing behavior of Japanese newspapers.  This will 
require econometric estimation of the demands facing Japanese newspapers and of their costs 
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of production, and that is the main focus of the remainder of the paper. 
 
3.  Demand for Newspaper Subscriptions 
I begin by describing random-parameter logit estimates of the demand for Japanese 
newspaper subscriptions. The data for this estimation come from the Japan Readers and Area 
Data (JREAD) survey conducted by Video Research Ltd.  This is a random-direct-dial 
telephone survey conducted in March each year that profiles newspaper readers and 
subscribers throughout Japan. The data are mostly used by advertisers.  I purchased temporary 
access to the 2007 survey with funds from a JSPS grant.  From the 2007 edition of the survey 
(with some considerable effort) I collected micro data for the 27,788 respondents including 
which edition of which newspaper each subscribes to if any, age and education of the head of 
household, household annual income, prefecture of residence, and whether the respondent 
participates in local festivals and holiday events (a major focus of local community activity in 
Japan).  I used these data to estimate a utility function that relates the respondents` choices of 
newspapers to characteristics of the newspapers.  The data on newspaper characteristics 
mostly come from the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulation (JABC), augmented with data from 
Dentsu, Inc.  These include in which prefectures each edition of each newspaper was available, 
circulation, the subscription prices, number of pages of ads per month and number of pages of 
content per month.  Although the data are cross-sectional for the single year 2007 and the 
subscription price of each newspaper is geographically uniform, there does exist enough 
variation in the choice sets across prefectures (that is which newspapers in which editions are 
available for subscription), to estimate common parameters of an indirect utility function for 
newspapers.   
The basic econometric model is a multinomial logit model of utility with random 
coefficient on one variable, price of subscription.  The utility of newspaper subscription 
choice j by individual i is a linear function of (1) attributes of the choice, (2) interactions 
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between choice-invariant characteristics of the individual and attributes of the choice, and (3) 
an unobservable error 𝜀𝑖𝑖 that varies randomly across individuals and alternatives according to 
the Gumbel distribution (Type I Extreme Value distribution).  Stipulate also that the utility 
function coefficient on price of subscription 𝑝𝑖 varies randomly across individuals according 
to the Normal distribution3. 
[1] 𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖      
𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜎𝜐𝑖, where 𝜐𝑖 ~ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  [0, 1] 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 ~  𝐺𝐺𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁  
The individual i chooses from among his choice set Ci the one alternative with the greatest 
utility value. The choice set includes any newspapers available for subscription in the place 
where the person lives and the choice of subscribing to no newspaper at all (j=0).  It will be 
the case that 𝑥𝑖0 = 0 and 𝑝0 = 0, so by construction, the mean utility value of not subscribing 
to any newspaper is zero: Ui0=0.  
From the observed choice set of each individual, observed attributes of each 
alternative, observed characteristics of each individual, and observed choice of each individual, 
I estimate the parameters of the utility function that are common to all individuals (𝛽, 𝛼, 𝜎) 
using the method of simulated maximum likelihood (computed with the software NLOGIT).4   
                                                     
3 Stipulating that the coefficient on price is distributed normally does allow the possibility of 
positive price coefficient but in the actual estimates all 27,788 individual price coefficients are 
negative. I attempted estimates with price coefficient distributed lognormally but the estimates 
did not converge. On the merits and demerits of lognormal versus normal distribution of random 
parameters in mixed logit estimates see Hensher and Greene (2001). 
4 The probability that individual  i  chooses  j  is 
 𝜋𝑖𝑖 = ∫ 𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝛽′𝑒𝑖𝑖+(𝛼+𝜎𝜐𝑖)𝑒𝑖�∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝛽′𝑒𝑖𝑖+(𝛼+𝜎𝜐𝑖)𝑒𝑖�𝑖∈𝐶𝑖 𝑓(𝜐𝑖)𝑑𝜐𝑖  , 
where 𝑓(𝜐𝑖) is the density function of 𝜐𝑖.  The simulated approximate probability that individual i chooses j  is 
 𝜋�𝑖𝑖 = 1/𝑆� 𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝛽′𝑒𝑖𝑖+�𝛼+𝜎𝜐𝑖(𝑠)�𝑒𝑖�∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝛽′𝑒𝑖𝑖+�𝛼+𝜎𝜐𝑖(𝑠)�𝑒𝑖�𝑖∈𝐶𝑖𝑆
𝑠=1
 
where 𝜐𝑖(𝑠) is the randomly drawn value of 𝜐𝑖 on simulation s and S is the total number of simulations (which I 
set equal to 500).  The simulated log-likelihood function is 
ℒ̃ = ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑙�𝜋�𝑖𝑖�𝐽𝑖=0𝑁𝑖=1   
where  𝑑𝑖𝑖   =   � 1 if individual 𝑖 chooses alternative 𝑗     0 otherwise                                                     
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 The variables that enter the utility function are made up as follows. 
Attributes of the newspaper subscription choices that do not vary across individuals: 
—Subscription price (units=yen per month) pj  
—Natural logarithm of number of pages of content per month (“news hole”)  
 
Interactions between choice-invariant characteristics of the individual and attributes of the 
choice (with units of measurement equal to underlined expressions where present, otherwise 
equal to zero or one): 
—Age head of household (one of four discrete intervals)  × 
Natural log of pages of content per month 
 
—Household annual income (one of sixteen discrete intervals ranging from zero to 30-million 
yen or more per year) if greater than zero × 
1. Natural log of pages of content per month 
2. National newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
3. Local or Bloc newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
 
—Each national newspaper (Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei) × 
1. Survey response: “Participates in local festivals and holiday events.” 
   2. Head of household highest education level is college or above 
 
—For each national and bloc paper, square of road distance (th. km) from newspaper home 
base to each individual’s prefecture of residence (home base for national papers Yomiuri, 
Asahi and Mainichi: Tokyo, for Sankei: Osaka; and for bloc papers Chunichi: Aichi, Chugoku: 
Hiroshima, and Nishi Nippon: Fukuoka). 
 
Table 2 reports the utility function parameter estimates. Dividing the other 
coefficients by the estimated marginal disutility of subscription price converts them to 
monetary units (yen per month).  From the estimates several things are evident. First, the 
marginal value of a page of content becomes greater as income rises. Second, the value of 
morning-and-evening subscription rather than morning-only, holding constant pages of content 
per month, is greater the greater the income, and is generally greater for national newspapers 
than for other newspapers.  Third, the more distant is the prefecture of residence from the 
newspaper home base the lower is its value. This effect is stronger for the bloc papers than for 
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the national papers.  And among the national papers it is stronger for Sankei than for Asahi, 
Mainichi or Yomiuri.  Fourth, those who participate in local festivals and holiday events place 
a lower value on subscription to national papers; this effect is strongest for Sankei.  Fifth, 
college education inclines subscribers to more value Asahi and less value Sankei. 
Further interpretation of the estimates comes from simulations that expose the effects 
on demand for each edition of each newspaper of changes in subscription price or changes in 
number of pages of content.  I computed arc elasticities and arc cross-elasticities of demand 
with respect to changes in prices and pages of content, by simulating the effects of a 
five-percent increase in subscription price of each edition of each newspaper, respectively, and 
five-percent increase in numbers of pages of content in each edition of each newspaper, 
respectively. These estimates may be found in the appendix Tables A1 and A2.  It seems that 
the price-elasticity of demand of most newspapers lies between 1.2 and 2 and is a bit higher for 
the leading national papers than for the others. The elasticity of demand with respect to pages 
of content lies between 0.2 and 0.5.  This matches some results of other estimates of demand 
for newspapers in the literature.   
Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009) estimate a pair of equations describing the 
demand for ads and demand for subscriptions in Belgian newspapers.  The demand for 
subscriptions is specified as nested logit, in which readers first choose between subscription to 
the local paper versus a national one, and then choose within the one category or the other.  
Demand for subscriptions depends on the characteristics of newspapers and of readers, and on 
the prices.  Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen find that the elasticity of demand for 
subscriptions ranges from 1.25 to 3.05. Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) estimate a nested 
logit specification for reader demand and simple logit specification for advertising demand for 
Italys’ four national newspapers.  In their preferred specification the newspapers set ad rates 
noncooperatively but collude in setting cover prices.  Fan (2013) estimates a multiple discrete 
choice model of the demand for U.S. newspapers (a model in which demanders may subscribe 
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to more than one paper), with endogenous choice by newspapers of their quality and their 
prices, including price of advertising.  She uses the estimated model to simulate the effects of 
mergers of local papers with overlapping markets.  
Rosse (1970) estimates demand for newspaper subscription, using data for local 
newspapers across the US.  Rosse allows for curvature of the cost function (which my simple 
model here will not exhibit), and also allows demand for subscriptions to depend directly on 
amount of ads.  He finds a price elasticity of demand for subscriptions of 1.4, taking into 
account the effect of change in subscription price on amount of ads, as interpreted by Blair and 
Romano (1993).  Rosse was the first to notice that variation in demand across cities could be 
exploited as a kind of natural experiment in measuring the effect of shifting demand on the 
costs and pricing of local newspaper monopolists.  As far as I am aware, the present paper is 
the first to use this principal in analyzing Japan’s newspapers. 
 
4. Price of advertising and demand for advertising 
I will now specify and estimate equations determining the price of advertising and 
demand for advertising in Japanese newspapers.  For my purpose, it is necessary to 
accommodate newspapers that offer their readers a choice between a morning-only 
subscription and a morning-and-evening subscription,5 and that offer morning edition and 
evening edition advertising. 
 
4.1. Basic framework of demand 
Let s1 denote the number of morning-only subscribers to a newspaper and s2 be the 
number of morning-and-evening subscribers. And denote by km and am the pages of content and 
pages of ads in the morning edition, and by ke and ae the pages of content and pages of ads in 
                                                     
5 Virtually none proffer evening-only subscriptions.  The Shizuoka Shinbun claims to offer a 
choice between evening-only subscription and morning-and-evening subscription but based on 
circulation data, hardly any of their subscribers opt for evening-only. 
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the evening edition. Here an ad is defined as a printed item supplied to all subscribers, the same 
as the subscription content. The only difference is that the ad is paid for by the advertiser but 
the other content is paid for by the subscribers.  
Let us suppose that the demand for ads depends on the price to place an ad per 
subscriber, 𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑠1+𝑠2
  if in the morning edition or 𝑒𝑎𝑒
𝑠2
 if in the evening edition.  Let us also 
suppose that the readers regard the ads indifferently.  To keep matters simple, posit a 
constant-elasticity demand system facing the newspaper in which all elasticities have the 
appropriate signs and lie within meaningful ranges. Local approximation of the demand 





𝑁𝑙 𝑠𝑛� = �𝑁𝑙 𝐴1⋮𝑁𝑙 𝐴𝑛� + �−ξ1 ⋯ ξ1𝑙⋮ ⋱ ⋮ξ𝑙1 ⋯ −ξ𝑙��𝑁𝑙 𝑝1⋮𝑁𝑙 𝑝𝑛� + � θ1 ⋯ θ1𝑙⋮ ⋱ ⋮θ𝑙1 ⋯ θ𝑙 ��𝑁𝑙 𝑘1⋮𝑁𝑙 𝑘𝑛�  
As before, suppose that subscript 1 denotes the morning-only subscription to a particular 
newspaper and subscript 2 the morning-and-evening subscription to the same newspaper. The 
first two rows of equation [2] can be represented as follows, where  𝑘1 ≡  𝑘𝑚  and 
𝑘2 ≡  𝑘𝑚 +  𝑘𝑒 : 
Demand by morning-only subscribers:    
[3] 𝑠1 = 𝐴1 𝑝𝑠1−ξ1  𝑝𝑠2ξ12  𝑘𝑚𝜃1( 𝑘𝑚 +  𝑘𝑒)𝜃12  
Demand by morning-and-evening subscribers: 
[4]  𝑠2 = 𝐴2 𝑝𝑠2−ξ2 𝑝𝑠1ξ21  𝑘𝑚𝜃21( 𝑘𝑚 +  𝑘𝑒)𝜃2 
To these I now append constant-elasticity demands for newspaper advertising: 
Demand for ads in morning edition: 
[5] 𝑁𝑚 = 𝐵𝑚 � 𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠1+𝑠2�−ξ𝑎. 
Demand for ads in evening edition: 
[6] 𝑁𝑒 = 𝐵𝑒 �𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑠2 �−ξ𝑎 . 
I will maintain that the demands for advertising in each newspaper and each edition (morning 
edition, evening edition) have the same elasticity with respect to price per subscriber 𝜉𝑎, but 
differing intercepts.  
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4.2. Newspaper costs 
The costs of newspaper production depend on number of ads and circulation, and on 
amount of content.  These costs include first-copy costs and costs that depend on the number 
of subscriptions of each type.  For a particular newspaper offering both morning-only and 
morning-and-evening subscriptions: 
[7]    𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 = 𝑓𝑎𝑁𝑚 + 𝑓𝑎𝑁𝑒���������𝑓𝑖𝑁𝑠𝑓−𝑐𝑁𝑝𝑐 𝑐𝑁𝑠𝑓 𝑁𝑓 𝑁𝑑 𝑝𝑁𝑝𝐺𝑠 + 𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑁 + 𝑓𝑘𝑘𝐺�������𝑓𝑖𝑁𝑠𝑓−𝑐𝑁𝑝𝑐 𝑐𝑁𝑠𝑓 𝑁𝑓 𝑐𝑁𝑙𝑓𝐺𝑙𝑓 𝑝𝑁𝑝𝐺𝑠 +  
�𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚)�𝑠1���������������𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑛 𝑚𝑐𝑚𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑚−𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑛𝑠 +     �𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒 + 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑁𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒)�𝑠2���������������������������𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑛 𝑚𝑐𝑚𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑚−𝑎𝑛𝑑−𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑚 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑛𝑠 
Here, 𝑐0𝑚  and 𝑐0𝑒  are the unit cost of distribution in morning and in evening net of 
advertisers’ payments to distributors for including inserts (substantial in Japan, almost as large 
as advertisers’ payments to newspapers for print ads).  𝑐̅ is the cost per page of actually 
printing the newspaper (where k and a are the numbers of pages of content and of ads), fk is the 
first-copy cost of producing a page of content and fa is the first-copy cost to the newspaper of 
producing a page of advertising.  Notice that because of the terms 𝑐̅𝑁𝑚(𝑠1 + 𝑠2) and 𝑐̅𝑁𝑒𝑠2 
in the cost function, the costs are not separable into cost of subscription and cost of advertising.  
This makes it problematic to speak separately of the profits from subscriptions and from 
advertising.  
Most newspaper advertising in Japan is contracted through advertising agencies, of 
which Dentsu is the largest. The advertiser pays the ad agency the price set by the newspaper 
but the ad agency pays a lower price to the newspaper.  In the empirical estimates below I 
will take the publically posted advertising rates of the newspapers to be the prices actually 
paid by clients but consider the advertising prices received by the newspapers (which I do not 
observe) to be a set fraction 𝜓 of these prices, the difference representing the advertising 
agency commission (The commission rate is 1 − 𝜓 > 0 ). For reference, the standard 
advertising agency commission rate for newspaper ads in Japan is 15 percent.  
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4.3. Price of advertising 
Each newspaper chooses content, prices of ads, and prices of subscriptions to 
maximize an objective function. The objective function of a particular newspaper, again with 
morning-only subscriptions denoted by subscript 1 and morning-and-evening subscriptions 
by subscript 2, is:  
[8] max𝑒𝑠,𝑒𝑎,𝑘(𝜋1 + 𝜋2)   =  ∑𝜔1𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑗 + ∑𝜔2𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑗�������������𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑚𝑐𝑚 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑛𝑠  + 𝜓𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑎𝑚 + 𝜓𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑁𝑎𝑒���������������𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑚𝑐𝑚 𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑚 − 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 
Here the parameters 𝜔𝑖𝑖 are equal to zero or one depending upon the collusive regime and 
upon the commonality of newspapers. I assume that 𝜔12 = 𝜔21 = 1 because 1 and 2 are 
different subscription types offered by the same newspaper. Also, 𝜔𝑖𝑖 = 1 for all j.  In a 
fully collusive pricing regime 𝜔𝑖𝑖 = 1, for all i, j.  Revenue from subscriptions –or more 
precisely, the contribution of revenue from subscriptions to the objective function of the 
newspaper– does not directly depend on price of ads nor on quantity of ads (by my 
presumption that readers regard the ads indifferently). And there is no interdependence in 
demands for advertising across newspapers (by my presumption that each household 
subscribes to at most one newspaper).  It is thus possible to infer an advertising pricing rule 
that does not depend upon the state of collusion among newspapers.  The pricing rule 
follows from the necessary condition for maximizing newspaper profit as in equation [8] with 
respect to advertising prices, for morning edition, and for evening edition:  
[9] 𝑝𝑎𝑚 = �𝑓𝑎 + 𝑐̅(𝑠1 + 𝑠2)�𝜓−1 �1 − 1ξ𝑎�−1  
[10] 𝑝𝑎𝑒 = (𝑓𝑎 + 𝑐̅𝑠2)𝜓−1 �1 − 1ξ𝑎�−1 
Within this basic framework, much of the variation in price of advertising across newspapers 
can be related to variation in number of subscribers. The price of ads (not per subscriber) varies 
linearly with number of subscribers. The equations [9] and [10] can be pooled into a single 
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equation:  
[11] 𝑝𝑎 =  𝑓𝑎𝜓−1 �1 − 1ξ𝑎�−1 + 𝑐̅𝜓−1 �1 − 1ξ𝑎�−1 𝑠  
where 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑚 or  𝑝𝑎𝑒,  and 𝑠 = �𝑠1 + 𝑠2 ,    𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑠2        ,    𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑒   
Newspapers with greater circulation, all else the same, have higher ad prices: 
[12] 𝑑𝑒𝑎
𝑑𝑠
= 𝑐̅𝜓−1 �1 − 1
ξ𝑎
�
−1 > 0 ,  







= −𝑓𝑎𝜓−1 �1 − 1ξ𝑎�−1 𝑠−2 < 0 .  
It is conceivable that elasticity of demand for advertising would vary from one newspaper to 
another.  But it turns out that much of the actual variation in ad pricing across Japan’s local 
newspapers is linearly related to number of subscribers, as implied by the model just described 
and assuming that the elasticity of demand for advertising is the same for all newspapers.  
 
4.4. Estimates of advertising pricing equation 
     Table 4 reports OLS regressions in which newspaper ad pricing is a linear function of 
circulation as in equation [11]:   
[14]  𝑝𝑎 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑠 + 𝜖  
There are four different prices, so four separate regressions. The dependent variable in the 
left-most regression of the table is the price for a legal notice posted in the society page per 
centimeter width of a horizontal column (dan in Japanese).  This is the basic plain-vanilla ad 
rate that is the anchor for each newspaper’s menu of ad prices. The dependent variables in the 
other three Table 3 regressions are contract prices per horizontal column for black-and-white 
business display ads.  These vary depending on whether the contract is for one, five or fifteen 
horizontal columns, within a six-month period.  A page is divided into fifteen horizontal 
columns, so these are prices for one-fifteenth page, one-third page or one page, cumulatively 
within the contract period.  The rate for ads smaller than one horizontal column is the same as 
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for a legal notice and is priced per horizontal column per centimeter width.  A (Yomiuri 
Shimbun) page is 37.9 cm wide.  A (perhaps typical) small ad might amount to one half 
column (in other words 1/30th of a page), and so its price would be 18.95 x the price per 
centimeter portion of a horizontal column for a legal notice.  The regressions use 2007 
circulation, but 2003 was the year in which the prices were last changed; they have remained 
the same in the ten years since then.  The unit of observation is the particular edition of each 
paper.  Some of the observations are for ads placed in more than one regional edition of a 
national newspaper. For these I aggregated the circulation over the regional editions covered.  
With those observations excluded, Chow tests favored the pooling of national and local papers.  
Chow tests favored pooling of morning and evening editions even with those observations 
included.  The estimates reported in Table 4 are for the pooled sample.   The R-squared is 
0.89 for legal notice and 0.90 for the business display ads.  It seems that the basic framework 
adequately describes the newspaper advertising cost function and the ad pricing behavior of 
newspapers.  That is, the newspapers each face a similar elasticity of demand for advertising 
and have similar first-copy costs of supplying advertising.  The newspapers with greater 
circulation have correspondingly lower incremental costs and so set lower prices.   Picard 
(1998) notes an approximately similar pattern in the advertising rates of U.S. newspapers. 
 
4.5. System estimates of demand for newspaper advertising 
 To estimate the demand for newspaper advertising requires instrumental variables for 
advertising price because of possible endogeneity.  In my way of thinking here, the newspaper 
circulation determines the incremental cost per page of ads, and so given constant elasticity of 
demand for advertising, circulation also determines the profit-maximizing price of advertising 
per page of ads. But the demand for ads depends on the price per page of ads per subscriber.  
The fundamental endogeneity in ad price per subscriber arises from the effects of subscription 
price on number of subscribers. Using instrumental variables for circulation resolves this 
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endogeneity.  My instruments for circulation s are the number of households in the newspaper 
home prefecture if it is a local or bloc newspaper, a dummy variable if it is a national 
newspaper, and number of pages of content per month.  Because greater circulation lowers the 
incremental cost of pages of content, number of pages of content is a valid instrument for 
circulation (It is inversely correlated with circulation).  I estimate the following pair of 
equations with the generalized method of moments, using SAS software: 
 Equation 1—Advertising price per page of ads:   
[15]  𝑝𝑎 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑠  
Equation 2—Demand for advertising:   
[16]  ln 𝑁 = 𝛽0  + 𝜉𝑎 𝑁𝑙(𝛾0/𝑠 + 𝛾1) +  𝛽1  ln  𝐴𝑣𝑝𝐼𝑙𝑐𝑁𝑁𝐺  +  𝛽2 𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑓𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝑝𝐺  
Instruments for s: (1) pages of content per month, (2) newspaper home prefecture number of 
households if bloc newspaper or local newspaper, (3) dummy=1 if national newspaper and =0 
if not.  AvgIncome is average annual household income of subscribers to the newspaper and 
PcntCollege is the percent of the subscribers to the newspaper that have a college education. 
From the estimates which are in Table 4, the elasticity of demand for advertising 
appears to be about 1.3 with a standard error of 0.5.  This seems about right, close to the 
corresponding estimate for Belgian newspapers (=1.5) reported by Van Cayseele and 
Vanormelingen (2009), and the estimate for U.S newspapers (=1.6) by Rosse (1970). There 
are three pairs of regressions in Table 4. The dependent variables in the demand equations are 
the business display ad rates per page of ads divided by circulation, for 1-dan, 5-dan and 
15-dan contracts.  All three regressions are similar. 
From the Table 4 regressions we can glean some information about the first-copy 
cost of a page of advertising 𝑓𝑎  and the cost per subscriber of actually printing and 
distributing a page of ads 𝑐̅.  Based on the estimates using the 15-dan ad rate, if elasticity of 
demand for advertising 𝜉𝑎 is around 1.27 as here estimated, then first-copy cost of a page of 
advertising is 
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 𝑓𝑎 = 𝛾0 �1 − 1ξ𝑎� ≈ 1.03 𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑙 𝑐𝐺𝑙 𝑝𝐺𝑁 𝑝𝑁𝑝𝐺 × �1 − 11.27� = 0.2 𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑙 𝑐𝐺𝑙 𝑝𝐺𝑁 𝑝𝑁𝑝𝐺,  
and 
𝑐̅𝜓−1 = 𝛾1 �1 − 1ξ𝑎� ≈ 5.67 𝑐𝐺𝑙 𝑝𝐺𝑁 𝑝𝑁𝑝𝐺 𝑝𝐺𝑁 𝑠𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑁𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑁 × �1 − 11.27� =                                                                                                          1.2 𝑐𝐺𝑙 𝑝𝐺𝑁 𝑝𝑁𝑝𝐺 𝑝𝐺𝑁 𝑠𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑁𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑁.  
A widely repeated claim in both Japan and the US is that the standard advertising agency 
commission rate for newspaper advertising, 1 − 𝜓, is 15 percent. Presuming the other 
parameter estimates are accurate, that suggests that 𝑐̅ is around one yen per page.  
It is useful to compare this estimate of cost of printing per page with the subscribers’ 
marginal valuations of content pages based on the utility function estimate.  Figure 2 shows 
these marginal valuations averaged across subscribers for each edition of each newspaper 
plotted against monthly pages of content, km if a morning subscription, km+ke if 
morning-and-evening. The marginal values decrease as pages increase which reflects the 
diminishing marginal valuation of each person and self-selection of newspapers with more 
content by those with higher marginal valuation (because of their higher income for instance).  
The marginal value of content for the newspapers with most pages of content (large 
circulation morning-and-evening editions) are fairly close to one yen per page, actually a bit 
below that.  This is consistent with the “efficiency at the top” character of nonlinear pricing 
schemes as deduced in Mussa and Rosen (1978).  The profitable strategy is to supply the 
efficient quality of content to the higher valuing morning-and-evening subscribers but supply 
less than the efficient content to the morning-only subscribers to deter subscribers from 
switching from morning-and-evening to morning-only.  I explore this aspect of Japanese 
newspaper behavior in more detail in Flath (2013).  My point here is that the estimated 
marginal value of content to subscribers is consistent with per-copy cost of actually printing a 
page of content 𝑐 � of just under one yen per page.  
 I now turn to the pricing of subscriptions and choice of content. 
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5.  Newspaper Subscription Prices and Content. 
      The next task is to model the subscription prices in a way that can be used to infer 
whether Japanese newspapers set their subscription prices collusively and assess the effects of 
their doing so. As shown by Nevo (2001), price-cost-margins can be inferred from estimated 
elasticities and cross-elasticities of demand, conditional on the nature of the pricing regime. 
In our case, the price-cost margin is the percentage each subscription price exceeds marginal 
cost net of the marginal profit per subscriber from advertising. Because marginal cost net of 
the marginal profit per subscriber from advertising can be less than zero, price-cost margins 
greater than one can be consistent with local profit maximization, indeed can be required by it. 
That is, newspapers may set subscription prices in an inelastic range of demand, to capture 
expanded advertising revenue. 
First let us represent the objective functions for setting subscription prices and pages 
of content.  Following Nevo (2001), we again define parameter ω𝑖𝑖 equal to one if the 
revenue and cost of j enters the objective function in choosing subscription price of i and 
equal to zero otherwise. The objective functions are as follows for i=1,…n, (with subscripts j 
on advertising revenue and cost not shown): 
[17] max𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑎,𝑘 𝜋𝑖   = ∑ ω𝑖𝑖  �𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑗  + 𝜓𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑎𝑚 + 𝜓𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑁𝑎𝑒 − 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪�𝑖         =  ∑ ω𝑖𝑖𝑖  �𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑗  − 𝑥𝑖� . 
Arranged as the rows of a matrix equation, these objective functions become 




� = � 𝑝1𝑠1 − 𝑥1 ⋯ ω1𝑙(𝑝𝑛𝑠𝑛 − 𝑥𝑙)⋮ ⋱ ⋮
ω𝑙1(𝑝1𝑠1 − 𝑥1) ⋯ 𝑝𝑛𝑠𝑛 − 𝑥𝑙 � . 
Now notice that the derivatives of 𝑥𝑖 with respect to subscriptions 𝑠𝑖 are as follows
6 
                                                     
6 The last two terms in this expression 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑎
𝑠
 come from the marginal profit that arises indirectly from 
advertising with each copy sold (for given price of advertising pa):  
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[19]      
𝜕𝑒𝑖
𝜕𝑠𝑗
= 𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒 + 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑁𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒) − 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚(𝑠𝑚+𝑠𝑒) − 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑠𝑒  . 
Define the price-cost margin for newspaper subscription j as 




 . From [19] and [20], continuing the example in which subscripts 1 and 2 are morning-only and morning-and-evening subscriptions to the same newspaper: 
[21] �1 − 1
𝜆1
� 𝑝𝑠1 = 𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚) − 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚(𝑠1+𝑠2)  , 
and 
[22]    �1 − 1
𝜆2
� 𝑝𝑠2 = 𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒 + 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑁𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒) − 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚(𝑠1+𝑠2) − 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑠2  . 
Now the precise content of these expressions [21] and [22] depends on the equilibrium 
price-cost margins 1
𝜆𝑖
, which in turn depend on the pricing regime, represented by the 
matrixΩ (the matrix with typical element 𝜔𝑖𝑖 equal to zero or one).  The expressions [21] and [22] are valid for all pricing regimes.  The first-order conditions for choices of subscription prices are 




𝑠𝑖 −  1𝜆𝑖 ξ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑖  +  ∑ �1𝜆𝑗 ω𝑖𝑖ξ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑗�𝑗≠𝑖 = 0,  i=1…n.  Arranged as the rows in a matrix equation, these conditions become 
[24]   �
ξ1𝑝1𝑠1 ⋯ −ω1𝑙ξ1𝑙𝑝𝑛𝑠𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−ω𝑙1ξ𝑙1𝑝1𝑠1 ⋯ ξ𝑙𝑝𝑛𝑠𝑛 ��
1/𝜆1
⋮1/𝜆𝑛� = �𝑝1𝑠1⋮𝑝𝑛𝑠𝑛� . 
Price-cost margins for all subscriptions, conditional on the price-setting regime Ω, are thus (c.f. Nevo, 2001, p. 313): 
                                                                                                                                                                     




+ 𝜕(𝜓𝑝𝑎𝑁 − 𝑓𝑎𝑁 − 𝑐̅𝑁𝑠)
𝜕𝑠
= (𝜓𝑝𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑠) 𝜕𝑁𝜕𝑠 − 𝑐̅𝑁 
= (𝜓𝑝𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑠)𝜓𝑒𝑎𝜉𝑎𝑠 − 𝑐̅𝑁  
= 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑎
𝑠
− 𝑐̅𝑁  
This marginal profit equals the marginal revenue that arises indirectly from advertising (=𝜓paa/s), minus the 
added-cost-per-copy attributable to advertising (=𝑐̅𝑁). Note also that 
𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒 + 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑁𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒) = 𝜕 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝜕𝑠𝑗 − 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑁𝑒) 
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[25]   �
1/𝜆1







I will explore several pricing regimes: Nash pricing by each newspaper, collusive pricing to 
maximize joint profit of all newspapers, and collusive pricing by a subset of the newspapers 
with Nash pricing by the others. 
     My strategy for determining which pricing regime best describes the data is to 
determine the precise unit costs of distribution 𝑐0𝑚  and 𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒  of each newspaper 
implied by each regime, and compare them across regimes. From [21] and [22], for a 
morning-only subscription 
[26] 𝑐0𝑚 =  �1 − 1𝜆1� 𝑝𝑠1 − 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚) + 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚(𝑠1+𝑠2)  , 
and for a morning-and-evening subscription 
[27]    𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒 = �1 − 1𝜆2� 𝑝𝑠2 − 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑁𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒) + 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚(𝑠1+𝑠2) + 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑠2  . 
I observe for each newspaper the subscription price 𝑝𝑠, monthly number of pages k+a, and 
gross advertising revenue per subscriber 𝑒𝑎𝑎
𝑠
.  From the earlier analysis of advertising 
demand and costs we have that 𝑐̅ = 1 and 𝜓 = 0.85. Thus to calculate unit costs of 
distribution requires only the price-cost margins 1
𝜆𝑖
, which vary depending on the regime. 
The main result of this exercise is that the Nash pricing regime is the only one that implies 
reasonable values for unit costs of distribution for most newspapers. 
 
5.1. Nash pricing regime 










�ξ2− ξ12ξ21ξ1 � = 1𝜉2   if  ξ12 = 0 . 
These expressions [28] and [29] capture cross-effects, as when the newspaper raises the price 
of morning-only subscriptions to increase the demand for morning-and-evening subscriptions. 




 for the Nash pricing regime based on the arc 
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elasticities computed from simulations using the mixed-logit utility function estimate. The 
mean value across newspapers shows that 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 average 1.4 and 1.3, slightly lower 
than 𝜉1 and 𝜉2 which average 1.6 and 1.8. This reflects the positive cross-elasticity of 
demand between morning-only subscriptions and morning-and-evening subscriptions to the 
same newspaper (𝜉12 and 𝜉21 which average 0.4). In the Nash equilibrium, newspapers 
offering both types of subscription would raise both subscription prices slightly to exploit this 
cross effect. 
     The values of unit costs of distribution implied by the Nash pricing regime are shown 
in Figure 3 for morning-only subscriptions and Figure 4 for morning-and-evening 
subscriptions.  These figures omit the extreme outliers. The implied values of 𝑐0𝑚 shown 
in Figure 3 range between 1,500 and 3,500 yen per subscriber per month, averaging around 
2,750.  The implied values of 𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒 shown in Figure 4 range between 2,000 and 5,000 
yen per subscriber per month, averaging around 3,500.   
 
5.2. Collusive pricing of subscriptions 
Under the Japan Fair Trade Commission special directive each newspaper is obliged to 
set geographically uniform prices but need not set the same price as rival newspapers.  Nikae 
(2010) usefully points out that the legally mandated geographic uniformity can itself lead to 
softer price competition.  This is not part of my analysis.  My focus here is on collusive 
pricing. 
There are various possible collusive regimes. In the simplest, the objective is to set all 
subscription prices to maximize the combined profits of all the newspapers. This corresponds 
to the objective functions of equation [18] with ωij= 1 for all i, j.  The price-cost margins of 
equation [25] for this case shown in Table 5 are implausibly large. The smallest is 2.6 and the 
average is 10.2. They imply unit costs of distribution that are negative and large, which is 
quite unlikely. Conclude that the newspapers are not pricing subscriptions to maximize 
industry profit. 
A further possibility is collusion by only a subset of the newspapers. The three national 
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newspapers Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri,7 and 13 local newspapers all set the same common 
price per morning-and-evening subscription of 3,925 yen per month which is the highest price 
set by any in my sample, and morning-subscription price of 3,007 yen per month which is 
also the highest of any in my sample. That leaves 33 other newspapers setting lower prices.  
The Shizuoka Shimbun is the largest circulation local newspaper with a subscription price 
below that of the national dailies.  Its morning-and-evening subscription price is 2,900 yen 
per month and its circulation tops 700,000.  Suppose that the newspapers setting the highest 
subscription prices (3,925 yen per month for morning-and-evening and 3,007 yen per month 
for morning-only) maximize their own joint profit, but the other newspapers price 
subscriptions non-cooperatively. For this exercise I consider that the Sankei 
morning-and-evening price is set collusively but its morning-only price is not. The implied 
price-cost margins for this case, also shown in Table 5 are smaller than for the industry cartel 
case but still implausibly large, averaging 1.66 and 2.26. 
Finally, a variant to the regime just described, presumes that colluding newspapers 
(those setting morning-only subscription price at 3,007 yen per month and 
morning-and-evening price at 3,925 yen per month), maximize joint profit subject to the 
constraint that all set the same price.  To compute the implied price-cost margins for this 
regime I simulated the effects of a simultaneous five percent increase in subscription prices of 
all of these presumptively colluding newspapers, using the indirect utility function estimates, 
and computed arc elasticities and cross-elasticities of the effects of this for the subscription 
sales of all the colluding newspapers combined. Here I consider Sankei not among the 
colluders. This is analogous to the Nash-pricing regime but with the subscription revenue and 
advertising revenue of the colluding newspapers aggregated as though the colluders were a 
single firm.  The price-cost margins of the colluders are computed using equations [28] and 
                                                     
7 Though the morning-and-evening subscription price of the other national paper Sankei is 3,925 
yen per month, its morning-only subscription price is 2,950 yen per month,. 
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[29], with the data for this being: 𝜉1 = 1.17 and 𝜉2 = 1.73   𝜉12 = 0.57 and 𝜉21 = 0.86 
and 𝑒𝑠1𝑠1
𝑒𝑠2𝑠2
=1.30 .  The result is: 1
𝜆1
= 1.55 , and 1
𝜆2
= 1.24 . The implied unit costs of 
distribution of the colluding newspapers for this regime (based on weighted average pages of 
content =1,099 morning and 1,530 morning-and-evening pages per month, with the weights 
equal to numbers of subscribers, and advertising revenue per subscriber =2,634 and 4,159 
yen per subscriber per month), are 𝑐0𝑚 = −119 yen per month, and 𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒 = 1,687 
yen per month.  These are vastly lower than the unit distribution costs computed for the 
presumptively non-colluding newspapers, and so implausible. 
 
5.3. Content k The typical first-order condition for choice of number of pages of content is 






















+ ∑ ω𝑖𝑖𝑗≠𝑖 �𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜆𝑖 � 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖   
Continuing the example where j=1 and j=2 are morning-only and 
morning-and-evening subscriptions to a same newspaper ( 𝑘1 ≡  𝑘𝑚 and  𝑘2 ≡  𝑘𝑚 +  𝑘𝑒), 
at the Nash equilibrium of content choice (with subscription price set collusively or not), the 
pages of content fulfill the conditions as below8:  
                                                     
8 These expressions (showing cost of content relative to subscription revenues) have a close 






This expression resembles the Dorfman-Steiner condition describing optimal advertising 
expenditure. This is because, analytically, the model here is the same as the Dorfman-Steiner 























These equations show the interdependence in pages of content for morning editions and 
evening editions.  From the demand estimates (appendix Table A.2), averaged across all 
newspapers: 𝜃21=-0.13, 𝜃12 =-0.08, 𝜃1=0.34 and 𝜃2=0.35.  The content cost relative to 
subscription revenue for each type of subscription to each newspaper (computed according to 
the right-hand sides of equations [32] and [33] using price-cost margins based on Nash 
pricing, are shown in the last columns of Table 5. These average 0.21 for morning 
subscriptions and 0.16 for morning-and-evening subscriptions. 
 From [32] and [33], a collusive increase in price-cost margins 1
𝜆𝑖
 would induce 
costly expansions of content. This could inhibit or constrain price collusion, because it makes 
the gain from maintaining a collusive pricing agreement smaller (higher prices mean more 
content) and the gain from cheating on a collusive pricing agreement larger (a price 
discounter reduces its content). As already noted, the Japanese newspapers observe a monthly 
newspaper holiday, which amounts to a coordinated withholding of content. Such 
withholding of content could be a practical accompaniment to price collusion, necessary to 
assure that the price collusion succeeds. If the collusive increases in subscription prices are 
small, as appears to be the case, perhaps the reason is that collusive restriction on content is 
limited to the once-a-month newspaper holiday. 
      
6. Conclusion 
Japan’s leading national newspapers and eleven of its largest regional and local papers, 
protected by a special 1953 exemption from antimonopoly law, have persistently kept their 
                                                                                                                                                                     
content, just as in the Dorfman-Steiner model demand for the product has constant elasticity with 
respect to quantity of ads. 
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monthly subscription prices at the same common level, which is higher than the subscription 
prices of the other newspapers with whom they compete.  Furthermore, all of the 
newspapers, not just the high-pricers, change their prices infrequently, and in unison.  Still 
further, all of the newspapers observe a monthly newspaper holiday, in which on the same set 
day they refrain from publishing.  Superficially at least, it appears that Japanese newspapers 
are acting collusively.  Yet the demand elasticities estimated here are not consistent with 
pricing that maximizes the joint profit of the leading (high pricing) newspapers.  
The conclusion that subscription prices lie below the levels that would maximize 
joint profit is based on new econometric estimates of Japanese newspaper demands and costs. 
I estimate the parameters of an indirect utility function, using micro-data compiled from 
survey responses of 27,788 persons living throughout Japan in March 2007.  From the 
estimates of utility function parameters I infer arc elasticities and arc cross-elasticities of 
demand for each type of subscription to each newspaper. Following the same logic Nevo 
(2001) applied to the US breakfast cereal industry, I use these demand elasticities to construct 
price-cost margins implied by each alternative pricing regime.  Price-cost margins for 
newspaper subscriptions are the percentages by which the subscription prices exceed 
marginal cost of printing and distributing the newspapers net of marginal profit from selling 
newspaper advertising. The actual price-cost margins for newspapers can be greater than one 
(because marginal profit from advertising can outweigh production and distribution costs). To 
determine which pricing regimes imply the closest match to actual price-cost margins 
requires information about costs and about the marginal profitability of ads. Accordingly, I 
estimate a system of demand for newspaper ads and costs of supplying ads, using 
cross-section data. Putting it all together, I find the assumption of Nash pricing yields 
plausible estimates of newspaper price-cost margins but the assumption of cartel pricing does 
not.   
There could still be some collusive increase in the subscription prices of Japanese 
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newspapers. The high-pricers could well have collusively raised their prices by around ten 
percent, and the prices would still be much closer to the Nash equilibrium than a cartel 
equilibrium. Indeed I believe that is the most likely. I have shown that collusive increases in 
subscription prices are likely to precipitate costly expansions of newspaper content, that both 
reduce the profit from collusion and make it more difficult to maintain collusion. Japanese 
newspapers have established the custom of observing a monthly newspaper holiday, a day 
each month when all refrain from publishing. The collusive restriction of newspaper content 
is a logical accompaniment to a modest collusive price increase.  
If the newspapers are collusively raising their prices, how much does it matter? This 
line of inquiry connects with previous literature. Similar estimates of newspaper demand to 
mine but based on aggregate data rather than micro-data have been used by others to assess 
the unilateral effects of mergers in the newspaper industries of the U.S. (Fan, 2013), and the 
Netherlands (Filistrucchi, Klein and Michielsen, 2012).  Using my estimates I can perform 
an opposite kind of analysis by simulating the effects of a reduction in price coordination 
among newspapers rather than an increase in coordination.  
      Let us calculate the effects on consumer surplus and newspaper profits of an end to 
collusive pricing starting with an assumption about how subscription prices would change if 
the special exemption from antimonopoly prohibition against resale price maintenance were 
revoked and coordinated pricing ended.  For this calculation, let us suppose that the 
newspapers now setting morning-and-evening prices of 3,925 yen per month and morning 
prices of 3,007 yen per month were to lower these by 340 yen per month and 140 yen per 
month, to 3,585 yen per month and 2,867 yen per month.  Suppose also that the other 
newspapers keep prices unchanged.  From simulation using the mixed-logit utility estimate 
of newspaper demand it turns out that these price reductions would confer an average 
increase in consumer surplus of 126 yen per month per household. This is the average 
difference in mean utility under the two scenarios divided by the utility of a one-yen price 
decrease (equal to the absolute value of the estimated coefficient on price), as in Small and 
Rosen (1981). Totaled over all 53.1-million Japanese households this would equal about 6.7 
billion yen per month (80.2-billion yen per year, roughly $800-million per year).  It would 
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increase total subscriptions of all newspapers by about 0.7 percent, which would have little 
effect on the demand for newspaper ads. Much of the shift in subscriptions would be from 
morning-only to morning-and-evening subscriptions of the same newspaper, rather than 
switching between national and local papers. It would reduce revenue from subscriptions by 
54.2-billion yen per year.  Further calculations imply that this would decrease newspaper 
profit by about 63.4-billion yen per year (46.2-billion yen per year among the collusive 
newspapers and 17.2-billion yen per year among the non-collusive newspapers).  The net 
increase in social welfare would thus amount to 90.2-63.4=16.8-billion yen per year.  
The calculation for effect on profit of the posited price reduction is based on the 
following and ignores any change in number of pages of content or ads. From equations [9], 
[10], [21] and [22], the profit of each newspaper company is 




− fa(am + ame) − fk(km + ke) . 
Collusive price-setting raises the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation [34], 
increasing profit.  An end to collusive price setting reverses this, and lowers profit.  Using 
the estimated values of λ1 and λ2 conditional on Nash pricing (corresponding to the no-cartel 
case) I impute the cartel price-cost margins λ′ for each newspaper from 
[35]     𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑐𝑒𝑜 �1 − 1λ′� = 𝑝𝑛𝑐.𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑐𝑒𝑜 �1 − 1𝜆� . 
The change in profit caused by reversion from collusive pricing to non-collusive is, for each 
newspaper:   










′   
All of this assumes that no newspapers would go out of business and that total costs of 
production would be little affected.  
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Appendix 1.  Data sources: 
 
Pages of Ads, Total Pages: 
Dentsu Inc. (Annual a). Dentsuu koukoku nenkan (Dentsu advertising annual), Dentsu.  
Dentsu Inc. (Annual b). Dentsuu shinbun nenkan (Dentsu newspaper annual), Dentsu. 
 
Subscription Prices, Circulation: 
   Japan Audit Bureau of Circulation, shinbun hakkousha repooto (Report on newspaper 
publishers), Nihon ABC kyoukai, semi-annual. 2007, and 2007 July-December, Jan-June. 
 
Prices of Advertising: 
Koukoutantou.com. Website http://www.koukokutantou.com/newspaper_1.html 
 
Survey of Newspaper Readers 
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Table 2. Random-parameter logit estimate of utility function 
 
Variable Parameter s.e. z 
Subscription price (yen per mo.) pj Mean of random coefficient   𝜶 -0.00073  0.00003  -23.8  
  s.d. in subscription price random 







     
𝜷:  
   
ln pages of content per month  lnkj  -0.143  0.057  -2.5  
lnkj  × Household annual income =    
  less than 1 million yen -0.055  0.020  -2.8  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen -0.097  0.016  -5.9  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen -0.050  0.015  -3.4  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen -0.005  0.014  -0.4  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.028  0.014  1.9  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.039  0.015  2.6  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.075  0.016  4.7  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.096  0.017  5.5  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.080  0.019  4.2  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.084  0.019  4.3  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.129  0.021  6.1  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.153  0.027  5.7  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.135  0.031  4.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.113  0.053  2.1  
  30 million yen or more 0.191  0.087  2.2  
      
lnkj  × Age, head of household =    
  up to 24 yrs. 0.271  0.050  5.4  
  25 yrs to 44 yrs  0.400  0.056  7.2  
  45 yrs to 64 yrs 0.603  0.057  10.5  
  65 yrs or more 0.755  0.059  12.7  
      
Morning-and-Evening subscription 




Household annual income = 
   
  less than 1 million yen 0.176  0.133  1.3  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen 0.233  0.105  2.2  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen 0.309  0.073  4.2  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen 0.394  0.063  6.3  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.287  0.062  4.6  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.290  0.063  4.6  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.359  0.063  5.7  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.516  0.067  7.8  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.495  0.077  6.5  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.625  0.073  8.6  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.656  0.069  9.5  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.771  0.080  9.7  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.844  0.102  8.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.969  0.176  5.5  
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Variable Parameter s.e. z 
 
Morning-and-Evening subscription 




Household annual income = 
   
  less than 1 million yen -0.187  0.192  -1.0  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen 0.487  0.116  4.2  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen 0.553  0.079  7.0  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen 0.438  0.071  6.2  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.365  0.075  4.9  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.465  0.076  6.1  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.447  0.079  5.6  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.452  0.089  5.1  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.699  0.102  6.9  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.659  0.103  6.4  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.495  0.101  4.9  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.651  0.130  5.0  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.727  0.171  4.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.754  0.305  2.5  
  30 million yen or more 1.267  0.300  4.2  
      












  Mainichi -1.266  0.040  -31.9  
  Yomiuri -0.339  0.029  -11.9  
  Sankei -1.808  0.066  -27.4  
      
Head of household highest education 











  Mainichi -0.471  0.048  -9.9  
  Yomiuri -0.152  0.039  -3.9  
  Sankei -1.028  0.079  -13.0  
      
Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri × Th. Km from Tokyo, squared -0.010  0.000  -41.3  
Sankei × Th. Km from Osaka, squared -0.056  0.002  -26.8  
Chunichi × Th. Km from Aichi, squared -0.211  0.021  -10.1  
Chugoku × Th. Km from Hiroshima, squared -0.932  0.064  -14.6  




Chi squared [65 d.f.]= 132,971 
Log likelihood function= -51,966 
Restricted log likelihood= -118,451 
Inf.Cr.AIC=104062 AIC/N = 3.745 




Table 3. Regression estimates relating newspaper ad pricing to circulation. 
 
OLS estimates of 
[22]  𝑝𝑎 =  𝑓𝑎𝜓−1 �1 − 1ξ𝑎�−1 + 𝑐̅𝜓−1 �1 − 1ξ𝑎�−1 𝑠 + 𝜖   





for legal  
notice 
(per cm) 
Advertising rate for display ad per page of 
ads (=15 dan) 
  
1-dan rate 5-dan rate 15-dan rate 
     
Intercept 8,184,111 2,455,071 2,205,316 1,944,448 
s.e. 669,478 387,169 367,110 330,189 
     
Number of subscribers 10.35  6.26  5.96  5.37  
s.e 0.38  0.22  0.21  0.19  
     
R-Square 0.89  0.90  0.90  0.90  
     
n=96 
    
      
   
Note. The sample includes observations for each edition of each newspaper: morning and 






Table 4.  GMM estimate of two-equation system, based on 1-dan, 5-dan and 15-dan rate for display ad. 
Equation 1—Advertising price per page of ads:  𝑝𝑎 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑠  
Equation 2—Demand for advertising:   ln 𝑁 = 𝛽0  + 𝜉𝑎 𝑁𝑙(𝛾0/𝑠 + 𝛾1) +  𝛽1  ln  𝐴𝑣𝑝𝐼𝑙𝑐𝑁𝑁𝐺  +  𝛽2 𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑓𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝑝𝐺  
Instruments for s: (1) pages of content per month, (2) newspaper home prefecture number of households if bloc newspaper or local 
newspaper, (3) dummy=1 if national newspaper, and =0 if not. 





   
pa ln a  
pa ln a  
pa ln a 
           
 









































           
 𝑁𝑙(𝛾0/𝑠 + 𝛾1) Nat. log of advertising rate for display ad per page of ads per subscriber as 





























-2.81    
 











           
𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑓𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝑝𝐺 
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Average marginal value of pages of content per month, per subscriber, for each edition 
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Yen per page 
pages of content per month: Km  or  Km+Ke 
 48 
Figure 3. Cost of distributing newspapers to morning-only subscribers, 
based on price-cost margins implied by Nash pricing of subscriptions 
 
Constructed from: 
 [26] 𝑐0𝑚 =  �1 − 1𝜆1� 𝑝𝑠1 − 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚) + 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚(𝑠1+𝑠2)  , 


































































































Dark bars indicate newspapers setting Pm=3007 and Pm+e=3925 
C0m , imputed from Nash pricing  
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Figure 4. Cost of distributing newspapers to morning-and-evening subscribers, 
based on price-cost margins implied by Nash pricing of subscriptions 
 
Constructed from: 
[27]    𝑐0𝑚 + 𝑐0𝑒 = �1 − 1𝜆2� 𝑝𝑠2 − 𝑐̅(𝑁𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑁𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒) + 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚(𝑠1+𝑠2) + 𝜓𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑠2  




























































Dark bars indicate newspapers setting Pm=3007 and Pm+e=3925 
C0m+C0e , imputed from Nash pricing  
